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A Proposed Taxonomy of Contracts
Stefanos Mouzas* and Michael Furmston†
We propose a classification of contracts based on their real-life usage.
Recognising that there are a number of different and overlapping ways of
classifying contracts, we can identify at least seven ways of doing this: (1) by
the subject matter, (2) by the way the contract is made, (3) by the function of
contracts, (4) by the time-horizon, (5) by the ability to renegotiate terms,
(6) by the involvement of consumers and (7) by the existence of mutual trust.
The proposed taxonomy draws our attention to a hitherto neglected area of
contract scholarship by revealing an underlying order in which multiple
elements in a contract are related to each other.
Introduction
Legal scholarship has not been particularly friendly to any form of taxonomic
work that attempts to map contracts and explicate legal doctrines in a rigorous
and systematic form.1 The lack of taxonomic work, in general, may be
attributed to the inherent tension between experience and logic in law. The use
of logic is indispensable in all attempts to create an accurate and rigorous
taxonomy. The taxonomic work of Peter Birks,2 for example, is based on a
rational analysis of causative events and rights that individuals may realise in
courts. Causative events of consent, wrong and unjust enrichment are linked
with the rights of compensation, punishment and restitution and create a
taxonomic matrix akin to Carl Linnaeus’s taxonomy of organisms in biology.
This kind of metaphor, however, is not always appropriate. A whale, for
example, is not a fish but a mammal. There is now no room for argument about
this. There is and is likely to remain plenty of room for argument for
classification of contracts. Notwithstanding the immense significance of
Birks’s taxonomy as a rational device for the study and the general
development of private law,3 its taxonomic logic is less useful if one wants to
classify contracts because of the existence of a multiplicity of overlapping
categories of legal concepts that have emerged through the history.
Classifications in contract law do not always fit squarely into conceptual
boxes. Undoubtedly, there are some criteria which apply only to contracts.
Hence, the central concern of our study is to look at relevant criteria that could
help us classify contracts.
Our ambition in this study is neither to classify contracts as a way of
identifying different types of contracts nor to deliver a prescription of how
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1 This critique is discussed in detail by B Simpson, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise:
Legal Principles and Forms of Legal Literature’ (1981) 48 UCR 632 at 679.
2 P Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.
3 A Burrows and A Rodger (eds), Mapping the Law. Essays in Memory of Peter Birks, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2006. Also see K F K Low, ‘The Use and Abuse of
Taxonomy’(2009) 29 Legal Studies 255.
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contracts should be classified. Instead, our objective is to offer a taxonomic
description of contracts within a normative system of action4 that exists today.
The idea of taxonomy derives from the Aristotelian concept of taxis which
means order. The term taxis implies a system, a structure or a pattern in which
multiple ‘elements of various kind are related to each other’.5As the life of the
law has not been logic but experience,6 traditional efforts to create taxis
(order) in contract law embrace classifications based on the subject matter of
contracts, for example, sale of goods, sale of land, employment, or insurance.
Classifications based on the subject matter of contracts are useful but they do
not reveal deeper underlying elements that are related to each other. Moving
beyond the subject matter of contracts, extant contract taxonomies are
severely limited to theoretical dichotomies, for example, contract in personam
versus contract in rem,7 discrete versus relational contract.8 Our attempt to
identify a ‘taxis’ in contracts is guided by two rather pragmatic questions. The
first question is whether the law of contract is the same for all contracts;9 the
second question is whether we can identify criteria that could help us
distinguish between different contracts on the basis of their real-life usage.
Although we can identify with certainty some distinctive characteristics in
particular types of contracts, the general principle in English law is that the
same legal principles should apply to the law of contract as a whole.10 In other
words, English law proceeds on the basis that there is a single law of contract
applicable to all contracts, together with rules applicable to individual
contracts. This is a distinctive feature of common law contract law. Books on
criminal law discuss both general principles and specific crimes. Books on tort
proceed similarly though there are probably tort courses in universities which
cover only negligence and related topics. In other systems, books and courses
4 Contracts represent a ‘normative system of action’ that is connected with other normative
systems. Hugh Collins identifies three co-existing normative systems of action: the contract,
the economic deal and the business relationship; see H Collins, Regulating Contracts,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.
5 See Hayek’s final systematic work: F Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Chicago
University Press, Chicago, 1973, pp 35–6.
6 O W Holmes, The Common Law, Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1881, p 1.
7 The implication of this theoretical dichotomy is significant. For the transfer of a good (res)
from the property of the seller to the property of the buyer we need two ‘transactions’: a
‘promissory’ contract that creates the obligation for the contracting parties to perform
(contract in personam) and a ‘dispositive’ or ‘property’ contract that transfers the ownership
— property rights — to the buyer which is the ‘entitled result’ (contract in rem). The same
contract, however, might do both.
8 This theoretical dichotomy attempted to explain patterns of business agreements: see I R
Macneil, ‘A Primer of Contract Planning’ (1975) 48 Southern California L Rev 627; C J
Goetz and R E Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracts’ (1981) 67 Virginia L Rev 1089; I
R Macneil, in D Campbell, ed, Relational Theory of Contract: Selected Works of Ian
Macneil, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001. It appears, however, that relational contract
theory has to some extent caused misunderstanding. The particulars of a ‘relational’ contract
derive from the specific function of the contractual arrangement and not from the fact that
a contract is relational, see M A Eisenberg, ‘Relational Contracts’ in J Beatson and D
Friedmann, eds, Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995/
2002, pp 297–304.
9 M Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 16th ed, Butterworths,
London, 2012, p 30.
10 Cehave NV v Bremer Handelsgesellschaft MbH (The Hansa Nord) [1976] QB 44.
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on contract law consider in some detail the law relating to specific contracts.
Recognising that there are a number of different and overlapping ways of
classifying contracts, we can identify at least seven ways of doing this:11
(1) by the subject matter;
(2) by the way the contract is made;
(3) by the function of contracts;
(4) by the time-horizon;
(5) by the ability to renegotiate terms;
(6) by the involvement of consumers; and
(7) by the existence of mutual trust.
Classifying Contracts
By Subject Matter
The traditional way to classify and teach contract law is to look at the subject
matter of contracts, for example, the sale of goods, the sale of land,
employment, insurance etc.12 In many countries, much of this material would
be taught in a contract course. In that respect, the most frequently used
contract is the contract for the sale of goods. Undoubtedly some problems
which actually relate to sale of goods are solved by general contract law and
others by applying the specific rules relating to sale of goods. This is true of
all the specific contracts. There are no general contracts for general contract
law to apply to. It is not easy to state in simple terms where the boundary
between general rules and particular rules runs except that the rules about
formation seem to be the same for all contracts.
A good example of the difficulties is the discussion which took place after
the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd13 as to whether the reclassification of terms into
conditions, innominate terms and warranties applied to sale of goods. Those
of us who were teaching contract law then can remember that there were
serious scholars who thought the framework of the Sale of Goods Act
excluded this possibility. Their doubts were swept aside by The Hansa Nord14
but the general problem remains. Chalmers saw the problem and provided that
much of general contract law was to be implied into the Sale of Goods Act.15
The Sale of Goods Act 1893 and the later amendments which are now
consolidated in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 provided the statutory framework
that regulates the sale of goods. Daily, billions of contracts for the sale of
goods are concluded and performed. Consider the sales in supermarkets or in
millions of other small and large shops in cities, towns and villages. The
11 Our method of inference by postulating seven different ways of classifying contracts
involved several cycles of inquiry, whereby we moved to an interplay between theoretical
concepts and empirical observations. In this effort, we looked at contracts as enforceable
manifestations of consent, see R E Barnett, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’ (1986) 86 Colum
L Rev 269. A consent-based understanding of contracts encouraged us to search for relevant
criteria that circumscribe the interaction between contracting parties.
12 See Chitty on Contracts, Vol II, Specific Contracts, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2012.
13 [1962] 2 QB 26.
14 [1976] QB 44.
15 Sale of Goods Act (UK), s 62(2).
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current legal principles that govern these sales transactions reflect the
long-established reasonable expectations of buyers and sellers. For example,
there is the expectation of the seller to be paid and the expectation of the buyer
to acquire property in an acceptable quality. The expectations of buyers and
sellers in the example above demonstrate that the sale of goods represents an
act that amalgamates the law of obligations and the law of property. But
experience is not limited to one case; the historically accumulated case
experience matters because it provides the most fundamental contribution to
the law of contract. Classifying contracts by subject matter is not restricted to
the sale of goods. The subject matter of the contract may be the sale of land,
employment, banking or insurance. In each of these subject matters, contracts
are regulated by detailed rules which have been developed for the particular
contract.
By the Way the Contract Is Made
Classifying contracts by the way they are made dates back to Roman law. In
classical Roman law, contracts could be verbal, literal, real or consensual. This
four-fold classification is to be found both in the Institutes of Gaius and
Justinian but the law undoubtedly developed in the four centuries between.
For the present purpose, the two most important categories are verbal and
consensual. In classical law a wide range of promises could be made by
formal question and answer by the contract stipulatio. The four consensual
contracts — sale, hire, partnership and mandate — are a model for modern
law because consent alone was required.16
Looking at modern transactions by the way they are made, we propose three
subcategories of contract:
(1) informal cash transactions;
(2) standard form printed contracts; and
(3) individually negotiated contracts.
Informal cash transactions are ubiquitous in our everyday life, for example
when we buy a coffee or newspaper. Standard form printed contracts contain
general terms and conditions which usually apply to discrete and, often,
anonymous transactions. Standard form printed contracts contain terms which
one of the contracting parties has defined in advance with the intention to
incorporate them into multiple transactions. In more complex transactions,
businesses use a set of clauses, known as boilerplate clauses.17 Standard
printed contracts are a demonstration of an ongoing rationalisation and
adaptation process to the evolving needs of commercial practice.18 Standard
16 See D Johnston, ‘The Logic and Experience in Roman Law’ in A Burrows and A Rodger,
eds, Mapping the Law, Essays in Memory of Peter Birks, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2006, pp 513–24.
17 R Christou, Boilerplate Clauses: Practical Issues, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2002.
18 The impetus for their growth in use during the second half of the 19th century came from
the massive industrialisation and rapid expansion of services, particularly in the financial,
insurance and transportation sectors. The significant publication of Raiser’s monograph in
1935 instigated a discussion of the importance of general terms and conditions and the need
for an effective control by administrative authorities and courts; see L Raiser, Das Recht der
Allgemeinen Gescha¨ftsbedingungen, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg, 1935. Despite
Raiser’s enormous influence among academic scholars, legislative powers in Europe needed
4 (2013) 30 Journal of Contract Law
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printed contracts are designed and used by businesses to increase operational
efficiency and to promote economies of scale by replicating similar
commercial transactions. It is obvious that standard printed contracts are
instrumentalised to pass on risks and liabilities to other contractual parties.19
It is hardly surprising that exclusion or limitation clauses are among the most
contentious cornerstones of standard printed contracts. A good guidance
regarding standard printed contracts is provided by professional institutes,
trade associations or tribunals. They usually update and publish standard
conditions of contracts.20 Standard form contracts come in two subclasses. In
one the form is drafted by one side with its own interests principally in mind.
In the other the parties adopt and often adapt an industry-wide form which is
roughly neutral between the parties. Bills of lading, charterparties and
standard construction contracts are obvious examples.
Individually negotiated contracts are manifestations of consent in which
contracting parties have negotiated the terms of the contract individually. For
example, business-to-business agreements are usually negotiated individually.
The negotiation process is often long and it may involve several actors.
By the Function of the Contract
The function of the contract constitutes a relevant taxonomic criterion.
However, it appears that there is a lack of attention among contract scholars
to function of the contract.21 When we assess the function of a contract, we
look at the nature and purpose of the contract. Some contracts, for example,
are of their nature necessarily executory; that is where the making of the
contract always comes distinctly before performance. Contracts to marry are
the classic example, though they are no longer contracts in English law. Bets
are usually another example — now contracts once more.
Another example is the framework contract. A framework contract22
between parties is a contractual arrangement that provides a framework of
clauses which regulate future contracts. Generally, framework contracts are
not concerned with immediate contractual decisions.23 The buyer, for
more than 40 years to react with an actual drafting of statutes. See eg Unfair Contract Terms
Act 1977 and AGB-Gesetz 1976. See also J Adams and R Brownsword, ‘The Unfair
Contract Terms Act: A Decade of Discretion’ (1988) 104 LQR 94; S Bright, ‘Winning the
Battle Against Unfair Contract Terms’ (2000) 20 Legal Studies 331.
19 S Macaulay, ‘The Standardized Contracts of United States Automobile Manufacturers. The
Impact of Large Scale Business Enterprise Upon Contract’, in International Encyclopaedia
of Comparative Law, Vol VII (3), Mohr, Tuebingen, 1974.
20 See eg ICE Conditions of Contracts, 7th ed, 1999; Standard Form of Building Contract,
1998; and Private with Quantities and Standard Building Contract without Quantities, 2005
published by JCT (Sweet and Maxwell).
21 The Austrian Arthur Schnitzer was among the first contract scholars who advanced our
knowledge of the importance of looking at the functional criterion. For the importance of the
functional criterion, see A Schnitzer, Die funktionelle Anknu¨pfung im internationalen
Vertragsrecht, Festgabe Scho¨nenberger, Freiburg i.Ue, 1968, p 387.
22 Also known as ‘umbrella agreement’, see S Mouzas and M Furmston, ‘From Contract to
Umbrella Agreement’ (2008) 67 CLJ 37. German lawyers use the term Rahmenvertrag or
Rahmenvereinbarung, see W Kru¨ger, Mu¨nchener Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch,
Band 2a, 1103-1104, C H Beck, Mu¨nchen, 2003.
23 Nevertheless, a number of business agreements might include immediate contractual
decisions leaving some of the terms open. In these cases, it seems to be more appropriate to
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example, has no obligation to buy a specified amount of goods or to accept
future offers. In this way, the function of a framework contract is to set up the
framework of future selection processes.24 The parties to a framework contract
are not required to specify new terms in their future contracts nor are they
required to refer to the pre-existence of a framework contract. The advantage
of this function is that it allows the update of consent over time and reduces
transaction costs, which are the costs in terms of time and effort to select,
manage and oversee single transactions. For this reason, framework contracts
are often encountered in regular, stable and established commercial
relationships.
By the Time-horizon
Some contracts are, at least on one side, for performance over a long term.
Consider insurance, major building, shipbuilding and aircraft building
contracts. Many contracts of employment, but also leasing contracts, fall into
this category. In many of these contracts, the balance of economic advantage
will be liable to change over time. So what seemed an attractive deal at the
time of the contract may become unattractive without either party being at
fault. In civil law jurisdictions, long-term contracts are recognised as a legal
category. They can be compared with the legal term
‘Dauerschuldverhaeltnisse’ (long-term contracts) in new German Law of
Obligation, BGBl I, S 3138, effective at 1 January 2002. Accordingly,
‘Dauerschuldverhaeltnisse’ (long-term contracts) include tenancy and leasing
agreements, licence agreements, distribution agreements as well as
management or know-how transfer agreements. The particularity of these
long-term agreements is that contracting parties need to show mutual respect
to the interests of their counterparts, especially with regard to the principle of
good faith (Treu and Glauben).25 Notwithstanding the relevance of long-term
contracts in the German Law of Obligation, long-term contracts are not yet
recognised as a separate legal category in common law. There are calls that
reject the claim for a separate category of long-term contracts with the
argument that it is largely left to the related parties to include into their
contracts clauses such as ‘force majeure’, ‘hardship’ or ‘third-party
intervener’ which deal with particular contextual eventualities.26
By Ability to Renegotiate Terms
The ability to renegotiate terms is a significant criterion for the classification
of contracts. There are contracts where the ability to negotiate effectively
view these contractual arrangements as open terms agreements, see M P Gergen, ‘The Use
of Open Terms in Contract’ (1992) 92 Colum L Rev 997.
24 The underlying assumption is related to the notion of contract as selection framework
(‘Selektionsumfeld’ als Vertragsgegenstand), see H Von der Crone,
Rahmenvertra¨ge.Vertragsrecht-Systemtheorie-Oekonomie Schulthess Polygraphischer
Verlag, Zu¨rich, 1993.
25 For a contemporary analysis, see E Flohr and J Klapperich, Dauerschuldverhaeltnisse nach
der Schuldreform, ZAP Verlag fuer Rechts-und Anwaltspraxis, Duesseldorf, 2003).
26 E McKendrick, ‘The Regulation of Long-term Contracts in English Law’, in J Beatson and
D Friedmann, eds, Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1995/2002, pp 305–33.
6 (2013) 30 Journal of Contract Law
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changes dramatically once the contract is made. Consider the appointment as
manager of a Premiership football club as a classic example. The manager will
never be in such a good bargaining position again as the moment before he
signs the contract. The term renegotiation may imply two different things. It
may imply a complete re-negotiation of contract terms or renegotiation of
certain terms.27 If renegotiation were costless, the parties to an agreement
would negotiate to change any provision which prevents them increasing the
creation of value.28 Therefore, commercial companies usually constrain
renegotiation by institutionalising negotiation processes or annual, quarterly
or periodic business reviews; they also establish control systems which may
include mutual notification, key communication dates throughout the year or
electronic data interchange. Control systems can verify contractual
performance on an ongoing basis and they can support the exercise of
termination rights.29 The possibility of renegotiation may be limited by the
inclusion of ‘force majeure’ or by agreed alternatives to litigation30 such as
arbitration according to the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.
By the Involvement of Consumers
Many contractual arrangements involve consumers and these contracts are not
individually negotiated. Consider contracts between retailers and the
consumers or financial and credit contracts. For those cases where one of the
parties is a consumer, there is a strong and increasing tendency to make
special rules. Contracts that involve consumers are nowadays regulated by
statutes to which do not always conform to traditional principles of contract
law.31 The aim of these statutory regulations is to ensure ‘consumer
protection’ and ‘fairness’ in transactions with consumers. More generally, the
increasing importance of codified legal restrictions, as well as the growing
importance of statutes, cannot be overlooked;32 a logical consequence of
applying the involvement of consumers as taxonomic criterion is to classify
contracts into commercial contracts and consumer contracts. This
classification does not imply that commercial contracts are immune from
regulatory intervention. Norms such as good faith or fair dealings set new
objective standards in the conclusion of commercial contracts.33
Notwithstanding the validity of traditional contract principles, a number of
27 For the importance of renegotiation, see I Ayres, ‘Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship’
(2003) 112 Yale LJ 881.
28 R H Coase, ‘The New Institutional Economics’ (1992) 88 American Economic Review 72.
29 A monitoring of contractual performance is particularly useful in cases where time is of the
essence and there is delay in performance by the promisor, see J E Stannard, ‘The
Contractual Last Chance Saloon: Notices Making Time Of Essence’ (2004) 120 LQR 137.
30 J Effron, ‘Alternatives to Litigation: Factors in Choosing’ (1989) 52 MLR 480.
31 See eg Consumer Credit Act 1974, Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts Regulations SI 1999.
32 J Beatson, ‘The Role of Statute in the Development of Common Law Doctrine’ (2001) 117
LQR 247. See also R Zimmermann, ‘Statuta Sunt Stricte Interpretanda? Statutes and
Common Law: A Continental Perspective’ (1997) 56 CLJ 315.
33 R Zimmermann and S Whittaker, (eds) Good Faith in European Contract Law, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2000. See also J Beatson and D Friedmann (eds), Good Faith
and Fault in Contract Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002; and G McMeel, ‘Prior
Negotiations and Subsequent Conduct — The Next Step Forward for Contractual
Interpretation?’ (2003) 119 LQR 272.
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contemporary developments such as the provisions in the Convention on
International Sale of Goods (the Vienna Convention), the United States’
Uniform Commercial Code and Restatement (Second) of Law of Contracts,
the gradual emergence of a European legal thinking34 and the process of legal
harmonisation in Europe are affecting the way we view commercial contracts
and our view of the rights which arise from them. The way that commercial
contracts are viewed in practice is changing in three directions: first, there is
a gradual acceptance of new international commercial standards and
regulations in the conclusion and performance of contracts; second, courts are
taking a more purposive approach and shifting away from literalist methods to
questions of interpretation of contracts;35 and, third, the need to take into
account all the surrounding circumstances of contractual relationships is
gradually becoming apparent.36
By Existence of Mutual Trust
Many contracts are made between strangers. In such cases, it is sensible to
take into account the possibility that the other party’s performance will be
defective. Of course, this risk might also be quite small. In practice, the parties
will often behave differently if they trust each other. Accurate assessment of
whom you can trust is undoubtedly a major commercial skill for
contract-makers. However, trust is an anthropocentric notion; and as such
inextricably linked to human beliefs, sentiments or intentionality.37 It may be
possible to have trust in an organisation; however, trust by an organisation
appears to be nonsensical.38 As such trust is more easily applicable to
34 Markesinis speaks about a ‘gradual convergence’, see B Markesinis (ed), The Gradual
Convergence: Foreign Ideas, Foreign Influences and English Law on the Eve of the 21st
Century, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, while Zimmermann draws our attention to
the emergence of a ‘European Legal Science’, see R Zimmermann, ‘Savigny’s Legacy.
Legal History, Comparative Law and the Emergence of a European Legal Science’ (1996)
112 LQR 576.
35 This shift is vividly demonstrated in the speech of Lord Hoffmann in Investors
Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896. For a
general discussion, see C Staughton, ‘How Do the Courts Interpret Commercial
Contracts?’(1999) 58 CLJ 303; K Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, Sweet and
Maxwell, London, 2004; A W Katz, ‘The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract
Interpretation’ (2004) 104 Colum L Rev 496. See also the Chancery Bar lecture of Lord
Nicholls, ‘My Kingdom for a Horse’ (2005) 121 LQR 577. The two cases cited by Lord
Nicholls, The Karen Oltmann [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 708 and The Pacific Colocotronis
[1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 40 are reviewed in a further Note by A Berg, ‘Thrashing through the
Undergrowth’ (2006) 122 LQR 354.
36 See D Campbell, H Collins and J Wightman (eds), Implicit Dimensions of Contract:
Discrete, Relational and Network Contracts, European Private Law Theory, Hart
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2003. See also G McMeel, ‘Prior Negotiations and
Subsequent Conduct — The Next Step Forward for Contractual Interpretation?’ (2003) 119
LQR 272.
37 See S Mouzas, S Henneberg and P Naude´, ‘Trust and Reliance in Business
Relationships’(2007) European Journal of Marketing 41(9/10):1016–32. See also R C
Solomon and F Flores, Building Trust, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; F Fukuyama,
Trust, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1995; D G Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior, Academic Press,
New York, 1981; P H Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life, John Wiley, New York,
1964.
38 See G Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, transl by K H Wolff, Free Press, New York,
8 (2013) 30 Journal of Contract Law
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interpersonal relationships than interfirm relationships.39 In almost all
contracts there is an element of reliance on the other party. If I buy a coffee
from a restaurant I have never been to before, I am relying on their making it
in an acceptable way. This is quite different from saying that I trust them. Trust
and reliance overlap but they are clearly distinct. This is shown by the unusual
facts of Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Royal Bank of Scotland.40 In
this case, the defendants (RBS) sold to the claimants (RZB) a £10,000,000
share in a facility it was providing to Enron. At the time of the transaction both
RBS and RZB and most of the world thought Enron a highly successful
company but they were soon to discover better. The contractual arrangements
were complex and difficult to summarise but a central feature of the dealings
between RBS and Enron was that Enron had made a (contractually not
binding) promise that RBS would be made whole. This is very clearly stated
in Christopher Clarke J’s judgment:41
The assurances that were given (more than once) were given in very strong terms
and at a very high level. They were intended to be relied upon, and were relied upon,
as a means (so it was hoped and expected) of ensuring that RBS would get the
required return. In a different context, there would be no difficulty in inferring that
they had been intended to have contractual effect, particularly given that the words
used were words of promise in a business setting. In the present context, for the
reasons already stated, it was important that they should not have contractual effect.
For that very reason, it was desirable that they should be given in terms as absolute,
and at a level as high as was possible; so that, although the assurances were not
contractual undertakings, they were the next best thing. In that way, the likelihood
of Enron reneging on them was reduced. Several RBS witnesses regarded it as
unthinkable for Enron to walk away from such assurances and something which
would impact very badly on its strategy for dealing with banks. That was how
relationship banking — in which oral assurances are not uncommon — worked. It
is clear from the terms of the Credit Application (see para 7.2) that RBS’ reliance
was on its relationship with Enron. It is also clear from the evidence of Mr Hardy
that he did not regard what Mr Chivers said to him on 20 September 2000 as a
legally binding promise (the very point of this transaction was that any support from
Enron to the bank could not be binding).
Trust was in effect here a substitute for contractual reliance.
Relationships between businesses are invariably based on considerations of
mutual interest and risk assessment.42 In risk-laden business-to-business
relationships, the establishment of accountabilities through explicit
performance standards and monitoring may be in conflict with interpersonal
trust. If contracting parties are genuinely open, their behaviour will facilitate
the exchange of information that is necessary to move the process of value
creation forward; but this openness might be exploited by counterparts who
1950. Also G Moellering, R Bachmann and S H Lee, ‘Understanding Organizational Trust,
Foundations, Constellations and Issues of Operationalisation’(2004) 19(6) Journal of
Managerial Psychology 556–70.
39 R Hardin, ‘Trusting Persons, Trusting Institutions’, in R J Zeckhauser, ed, Strategy and
Choice, MIT Press, London, 1991.
40 [2010] EWHC 1392 (Comm).
41 [2010] EWHC 1392 (Comm) at [143].
42 J K Sebenius, ‘Negotiation analysis: A characterization and review’ (1992) Management
Science, 38(1), pp.18-38.
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are more concerned with value-claiming. Conversely, if the contracting parties
are competitive in claiming value, they might limit or prevent the achievement
of joint gains through give-and-take processes. Although trust might be more
applicable to interpersonal relationships, its importance as a relevant aspect of
exchange relationships43, invites us to look at indicators of trust, such as the
occurrence of repeated exchange between contracting parties, and examine the
particularities of contractual arrangements in which we can observe the
existence of mutual trust.44
Conclusions and Implications for Contract
Scholarship
The effort to classify contracts is inevitably confronted with the problem of
relativity. Contract law is a ‘regime of correlative right and duty’; hence, ‘the
unity of the contractual relationship consists in the fact that contractual
performance is the content of both the defendant’s duty and the plaintiff’s
right’.45 The problem of relativity encouraged us to look at a classification of
contracts beyond their subject matter, considering further criteria such as the
way the contract is made, the function of the contracts, the time-horizon of the
contract, the ability to negotiate terms, the involvement of consumers and the
existence of mutual trust. These criteria broaden our view of contract as a
manifestation of consent. Consent is an intercognitive achievement among
contracting parties46 and is, ultimately, the moral basis that differentiates
between valid and invalid transactions.47 As a moral basis, consent treats
contracting parties as counterparts that bring ‘property rights’ to an exchange.
Any attempt to classify contracts would therefore require an insight into the
significance of property rights or entitlements that specify the substance of
correlative rights and duties that actors may possess, acquire, or transfer in
their interactions with others.
A taxonomy of contracts aims at the creation of a logical order; but this is
not always possible because there is inherently a tension between rational
order and real-life experience. Classifications of contracts do not always fit
squarely into rational categories. Recognising the existence of overlapping
categories, our proposed taxonomy of contracts attempted to reconcile this
tension by elaborating a logical classification of contracts on the basis of their
real-life usage.
43 Historians have emphasised the central role that trust has played in the development of trade
and banking, see J Stiglitz, Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy,
Penguin Books, London 2010.
44 The preponderance of empirical evidence suggests that umbrella agreements are drafted
when the contracting parties trust each other and thus they contemplate repeated exchange
in continuing business relationships, see S Mouzas and M Furmston, ‘From Contract to
Umbrella Agreement’(2008) 67 CLJ 37.
45 See E J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1995,
p 136.
46 Historical evidence and theory suggests that, absent consent, contractual arrangements are
not sustainable because they do not facilitate the creation of the maximum potential value,
see A T Kronman and P A Posner, The Economics of Contract Law, Little, Brown and Co,
Boston, 1979.
47 R E Barnett, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’ (1986) 86 Colum L Rev 269. Also compare R
E Barnett, ‘Constitutional Legitimacy’ (2003) 103 Colum L Rev 11.
10 (2013) 30 Journal of Contract Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 11 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Mon Mar 18 16:03:07 2013
/journals/journal/jcl/vol30/04-
The proposed taxonomy of contracts delivers three important contributions
to the study of contracts. First, classifying contracts on the basis of their
real-life usage can help us understand the context of contracts. This is possible
if we analyse contracts beyond theoretical dichotomies, such as contract in
personam versus contract in rem, to address the real problems that contracting
parties face in reaching consent. Second, classifying contracts beyond their
subject matter can help us address the unity of the contractual relationship as
the defendant’s duty and the plaintiff’s right. This allows us to incorporate into
our thinking correlative dimensions such as the existence of trust. Third,
classifying contracts on the basis of their real-life usage delivers a logical
order that draws our attention to new criteria and deeper underlying elements
hitherto neglected in contract scholarship.
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